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THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN ENGQUIST V.
OREGON DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE: WHY THE
COURT SHOULD HAVE CHOSEN THE SCALPEL
INSTEAD OF THE MEAT-AXE
Christopher Cazenave *

INTRODUCTION
In 2000, the Supreme Court, in its decision in Village of Willowbrook
v. Olech, 1 explicitly recognized an arguably different type of equal protection claim. 2 While there is substantial support for the role of the Equal Protection Clause as a restraint on unreasonable government classifications
(i.e., legislative classifications based on race, gender, etc.), 3 the Court in
Olech “conclude[d] that the number of individuals in a class is immaterial
for equal protection analysis.” 4 The Olech Court held that “[o]ur cases have
recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a ‘class of one,’
where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently
from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference.” 5 Although the language in the Olech opinion suggests that the
Court was merely reiterating longstanding equal protection jurisprudence, 6
lower federal courts began to limit Olech perhaps to satiate the fear that
everyday disputes would “com[e] into federal court dressed as a constitutional case.” 7
Lower courts have attempted to confine the class of one theory by requiring that plaintiffs prove one or more of at least three additional ele* George Mason University School of Law, Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2009; Executive Editor,
GEORGE MASON LAW REVIEW, 2008-2009; Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, B.S., Economics,
summa cum laude, May 2005. I would like to thank my wife, Crystal, for her patience and also my
parents, Daniel and Cynthia, for their endless encouragement and support.
1 528 U.S. 562 (2000).
2 See id. at 564. See also Robert C. Farrell, Classes, Persons, Equal Protection, and Village of
Willowbrook v. Olech, WASH. L. REV. 367, 367-68 (2003).
3 Farrell, supra note 2, at 371-80.
4 Vill. Of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
5 Id.
6 See id. at 564-65 (citing the 1923 Supreme Court case of Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota
County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923), to support the Court’s holding allowing for a class of one equal protection
claim).
7 Lauth v. McCollum, 424 F.3d 631, 632 (7th Cir. 2005); Jennings v. City of Stillwater, 383 F.3d
1199, 1211 n.4 (10th Cir. 2004) (collecting authorities which discuss the limitations that courts have
placed on class of one claims to lower the possibility for a federal cause of action to review decisions
made by state actors).
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ments not expressly declared by the court in Olech: (1) requiring that a
plaintiff show that comparators, the persons to whom the plaintiff is comparing herself, be “prima facie identical in all relevant respects”; (2) demanding that plaintiffs prove that the differential treatment was a result of
“totally illegitimate animus” or “vindictive action;” and/or (3) requiring that
a plaintiff show a specific intent to discriminate excluding the possibility
that the employer acted on the basis of mistake. 8 These additional requirements have led to some incongruity among the circuits. 9
Recently, in Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, 10 the Supreme Court revisited the class of one equal protection claim—this time, in
the context of public employment. 11 In a 6-3 decision, the Engquist Court
affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision to create a bright-line rule holding that
the class of one theory is inapplicable to claims brought by a public employee against his public employer. 12 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the
majority, agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s application of Olech which concluded that “[w]hether to apply the class of one theory to decisions of public employers presents a significantly different question than whether to
apply it to legislative or regulatory acts of government.” 13 However, before
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Engquist, no other court had gone as far as to
entirely disallow Olech’s application in the context of public employment. 14
While Engquist only limited the application of Olech and the class of
one theory in the context of public employment, post-Engquist decisions
coming from lower federal courts have used Engquist as a stepping stone to
further limit the scope of a class of one claim. 15 These courts implement
this limitation by first characterizing the government’s role in a particular
claim as that resembling the role of the government as a public employer. 16
Next, the courts are able to summarily dismiss the plaintiff’s claim by holding that because the government was granted broad discretion in a certain
context—similar to that granted in the context of public employment—the
government enjoys a per se exclusion from a class of one equal protection
claim. 17 This Article seeks to illustrate how the Supreme Court’s decision in
Engquist has federal courts answering the wrong question regarding class of
one equal protection claims. Unlike Engquist and its progeny, the exercise
8

Farrell, supra note 2, at 403-15.
See e.g., Bell v. Duperrault 367 F.3d 703, 709-12 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J., concurring) (describing post-Olech cases as “all over the map” and asking the Supreme Court to review its decision in
Olech).
10 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008).
11 Id.
12 Engquist v. Or. Dept. of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2157 (2008).
13 Engquist v. Or. Dept. of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 994 (9th Cir. 2007); Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2153.
14 Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1011 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2150.
15 See infra Part III.A.
16 See infra Part III.A.
17 See infra Part III.A.
9
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should not be solely focused on the threshold characterization of the government’s function in a given decision. Instead, this Article argues that the
added strictures placed on a conventional class of one claim already serve
to limit the fear that everyday disputes will come into federal courts disguised as constitutional cases. Therefore, rather than developing a complex
scheme of per se exclusions to the class of one claim, the Engquist Court
should have concentrated on strengthening—or weakening—the elements
of a class of one claim that have been developing for decades now in the
lower federal courts. 18 The solution is not to admit the well-settled principal
that the Equal Protection Clause “protect[s] persons, not groups” 19 only to
turn around and completely deny that protection to certain persons. Admittedly, current class of one equal protection jurisprudence is less than entirely clear, but as stated by Justice Stevens dissenting in Engquist, “the
Court should use a scalpel rather than a meat-axe.” 20
With that, Part I provides background discussing the contours of the
constitutional protection provided under the Equal Protection Clause, and
the birth of the class of one theory culminating with the Supreme Court’s
express recognition of the doctrine in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech. 21
Part II.A summarizes the transformation of the Olech class of one rule by
18

Some have argued that the class of one theory and Olech are inconsistent with equal protection
jurisprudence in its entirety. See Timothy Zick, Angry White Males: The Equal Protection Clause and
“Classes of One”, 89 KY. L. J. 69, 76 (2000) (concluding that the original understanding of the Equal
Protection Clause coupled with Supreme Court precedent does not support extending the Equal Protection Clause to classes of one). Additionally, both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits held, prior to Olech,
that showing membership in a class was required to state a claim. Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041,
1050 (6th Cir. 1999); Herro v. City of Milwaukee, 44 F.3d 550, 552 (7th Cir. 1995). In Bass v. Robinson, the plaintiff brought a civil rights action alleging that the defendant, a police officer, used excessive
force in effecting the plaintiff’s arrest. Bass, 167 F.3d at 1050. The Sixth Circuit in Bass held that
“[b]ecause the Plaintiff failed to allege invidious discrimination based upon his membership in a protected class, his equal protection claim fails at the inception.” Id. (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,
456 (1962)). Next, in Herro v. City of Milwaukee, an applicant for a tavern license filed a civil rights
action against local government officials following the denial of his application. Herro, 44 F.3d at 55051. Although the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court’s finding that the defendant presented a
plausible reason for Herro’s differential treatment, the Seventh Circuit went on to state that “[e]ven were
we to doubt to the plausibility of defendants’ asserted reasons for decision . . . this Court is skeptical that
Herro has established a prima facie equal protection claim. . . . A person bringing an action under the
Equal Protection Clause must show intentional discrimination against him because of his membership in
a particular class, not merely that he was treated unfairly as an individual.” Herro, 44 F.3d at 552 (quoting New Burnham Prairie Homes v. Vill. of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1481 (7th Cir. 1990)); see also
Futernick v. Sumpter Twp., 78 F.3d 1051, 1058 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e see compelling reasons that the
sundry motivations of local regulators should not be policed by the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution, absent the intent to harm a protected group or punish the exercise of a fundamental right. The sheer number of possible cases is discouraging.”).
19 Engquist v. Or. Dept. of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2150 (2008) (quoting Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
20 Id. at 2158 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
21 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
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discussing the various limitations that federal courts have placed on the
doctrine’s application. Next, Parts II.B, II.C, and II.D lay out the facts in
Engquist and the arguments presented by both the Ninth Circuit and the
Supreme Court in which both courts disavowed the application of the class
of one theory in the context of public employment. Part III concludes by
arguing that Engquist set the perfect stage for the Supreme Court to revisit
Olech and further clarify class of one equal protection jurisprudence as a
whole. Instead, Engquist has set the stage for yet more confusion among
lower federal courts. The next time the Court is presented with this opportunity, the Court should deeply consider Judge Reinhardt’s dissenting remarks made in the Ninth Circuit recognizing that—no matter what the context—the rational basis test employed in a class of one claim has always
served to protect individuals “against heinous governmental conduct.” 22

I.

BACKGROUND—EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

A. Prevention of Unreasonable Classifications Versus Protection of
Individual Rights
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment declares,
in part, that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.” 23 Although the language of the Fourteenth
Amendment appears to provide a protection against disparate treatment of
individuals, “[i]n most contexts, the basic role of the Equal Protection
Clause is to act as a limit on government classifications.” 24 “Indeed, the
driving force behind the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was the
desire to end legal discrimination against blacks.” 25 Therefore, heeding to
the view that the Fourteenth Amendment provides protection against unreasonable classifications, a plaintiff, to state a successful claim, must first
show that he is a member of the class allegedly affected by the legislative
classification. 26
However, the Fourteenth Amendment has also been alternatively interpreted to allow for protection of individual rights not based on membership in a particular class. 27 This alternative interpretation appears, at times,

22

Engquist v. Or. Dept. of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 1012 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
24 Farrell, supra note 2, at 367.
25 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 928 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring). See also Zick, supra
note 18, at 72-73.
26 See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW –
SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE, § 14.7, at 566-68 (3d ed. 1999).
27 E.g., Olech, 528 U.S. at 564.
23
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to be in conflict with the traditional class-based interpretation. 28 One commentator has noted that “like trains riding on parallel tracks that never meet,
the two incompatible views of equal protection do not come into direct conflict, but simply ignore each other.” 29 Others argue that allowing claims of
individual disparate treatment without reference to a particular class
“brushes aside a century of equal protection jurisprudence . . . .” 30 As the
name suggests and as discussed next, the class of one theory finds its origins in the Fourteenth Amendment’s role as a protector of individual
rights. 31

B. The Origins of the Class of One Theory
1.

The Seventh Circuit’s Role as Architect Behind the Class of One
Theory

While the Supreme Court in Olech cited to its 1923 decision in Sioux
City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County to lend longstanding support for “successful equal protection claims brought by a ‘class of one,’” 32 more recent
developments in the Seventh Circuit help to track the formation of a distinct
class of one equal protection claim. 33 In Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 34 a
discharged paramedic brought several claims against the city including a
charge that her termination violated her right to the equal protection of the
laws. 35 Plaintiff Eva Ciechon was terminated after alleged improper conduct where the facts revealed that her partner and co-paramedic, Richard
Ritt, was not terminated for the same improper conduct. 36 The court in
Ciechon held that the Equal Protection Clause protects people “against intentional invidious discrimination by the state against persons similarly
situated.” 37 The court further held that the city had no rational basis for discharging Ms. Ciechon while not disciplining Mr. Ritt and that “[t]his choice
was not made out of error, neglect, or mistake.” 38 The Ciechon court did not
require any showing that Ms. Ciechon was a member of a protected class. 39
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Farrell, supra note 2, at 367.
Id.
Zick, supra note 18, at 134. See also Farrell, supra note 2, at 375-79.
See Olech, 528 U.S. at 564; Farrell, supra note 2, at 379.
Olech, 528 U.S. at 564.
See Farrell, supra note 2, at 385-88.
686 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 516.
See id. at 522.
Id. at 522-23 (citing Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944)).
Id. at 523.
See id. at 522-24.
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Rather, Ms. Ciechon prevailed by showing that “[t]he unequal treatment of
Ciechon and Ritt was unreasonable and arbitrary and deprived Ciechon of
equal protection of the law.” 40
Next, Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit in Esmail v. Macrane, 41 upheld the equal protection claim of a liquor store owner who
claimed that the mayor violated his equal protection rights by failing to
renew the owner’s liquor license. 42 The store owner alleged that he was the
victim of a vindictive campaign by the mayor who controlled the issuance
of liquor licenses. 43 Taking these allegations as true on appeal, the court
stated that “[t]his is an unusual kind of equal protection case, though not an
unprecedented kind,” that fell under the purview of the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Ciechon. 44 The court stated that “[a] class of one is likely to be
the most vulnerable of all, and we do not understand therefore why it
should be denied the protection of the equal protection clause.” 45 Therefore,
under Esmail, a plaintiff has a successful equal protection claim by showing
that government action “was a spiteful effort to ‘get’ him for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective.” 46
Finally and rather suitably, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Olech v.
Village of Willowbrook 47 arranged for the Supreme Court’s review and definitive acknowledgment of the class of one theory as a valid claim under
the Equal Protection Clause. 48 Judge Posner, writing again for the Seventh
Circuit, reaffirmed the court’s opinion in Esmail holding that while the
Equal Protection Clause is more often raised by members of a protected
class, a valid claim also existed where an individual can demonstrate that he
is a victim of government action taken with “illegitimate animus” unconnected from any justifiable government purpose. 49 To summarize the underlying facts, the Village of Willowbrook (“Village”) demanded a 33-foot
easement as part of an agreement to connect Grace Olech’s home to the
municipal water supply. 50 Other residents of the Village were only required
to grant a 15-foot easement as part of the connection procedure. 51 Ms.
Olech’s complaint alleged that the Village’s purpose for the non-customary
easement was the fact that the Olechs’ had successfully sued the Village
40 Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511, 524 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing Olshock v. Vill. of Skokie, 541 F.2d 1254, 1260 (7th Cir. 1976)).
41 53 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 1995).
42 Id. at 178.
43 Id. at 177.
44 Id. at 178-80.
45 Id. at 180.
46 Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995).
47 160 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 1998), aff’d, 528 U.S. 562 (2000).
48 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
49 Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1998).
50 Id.
51 Id.
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several years earlier. 52 Judge Posner argued that the Olechs’ were not required to show permanent depravation or an “orchestrated campaign” of
retaliation and rather, a successful claim could be maintained by demonstrating that the defendants took “vindictive action” against the Olechs. 53
Judge Posner recognized the problem of constitutionalizing fairly trivial
municipal disputes. 54 However, he contended that this concern would be
satiated by requiring “proof that the cause of the differential treatment of
which the plaintiff complains was a totally illegitimate animus toward the
plaintiff by the defendant.” 55 “[A] tincture of ill will does not invalidate
governmental action.” 56 This requirement of “illegitimate animus” is significant to highlight because, as the next Part discusses, the Olech Court
removed the requirement of showing any “subjective ill will” only to have
this requirement quickly reinstated by lower federal courts. 57

2.

The Supreme Court Reviews the Seventh Circuit’s Decision in
Olech

In a short opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Olech validating the class of one theory. 58 However, dissimilar
from Judge Posner’s reasoning at the lower level, the unanimous Supreme
Court did not require that Ms. Olech illustrate ill-will or “illegitimate animus.” 59 Instead, a plaintiff stated a successful claim “where the plaintiff
alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” 60 Justice Breyer, in a concurring opinion, recognized that the Seventh Circuit’s requirement of “illegitimate animus” was intended to “minimize any concern about transforming run-of-the-mill zoning cases into
cases of constitutional right.” 61 The Supreme Court’s decision in Olech
made it unmistakable that the Equal Protection Clause does extend to protecting individual rights unconnected from membership in a particular

52
53
54
55
56
57

Id.
Id. at 388.
Id.
Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998).
Id.
Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000). See supra note 110 and accompany-

ing text.
58

See id. at 564-65.
Olech, 528 U.S. at 565.
60 Id. at 564.
61 Id. at 565-66 (Breyer, J., concurring).
59
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class. 62 However, the formation of the class of one theory is particularly
important because, as discussed next, the Supreme Court’s nonchalant recognition of this doctrine has led some federal courts to question whether
Olech was ever intended to significantly alter and augment equal protection
jurisprudence. 63 Lower federal courts almost immediately began to limit the
effect of Olech by either raising the burden to prove elements expressly
stated by the Supreme Court, 64 and/or by requiring plaintiffs to prove additional elements not set forth in Olech. 65

II. THE RECEPTION OF OLECH BY THE FEDERAL COURTS
Until the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Engquist, lower federal courts did
not place categorical restrictions on the application of the class of one theory. 66 Instead, courts implemented broad limitations that applied regardless
of whether the government was in its role as a regulator or as an employer. 67 First, this Part discusses the three doctrine-wide limitations that
have been placed on the class of one theory. 68 Second, the discussion turns
to introduce the facts in Engquist as well as the reasons set forth by the
Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court where both courts placed an unprecedented categorical restriction on the application of the class of one theory. 69
It is helpful to recall the rule in Olech to witness how the different circuits
have altered both the vocabulary and emphasis on different elements of the
rule:
Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a “class of one,”
where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others simi70
larly situated and there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.

62 See Farrell, supra note 2, at 400 n. 238 (“Although the Equal Protection Clause does not protect
individuals from adverse affects of reasonable legislative classifications, it does protect an individual
from an arbitrary individual administrative decision by a government official.”).
63 E.g., Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric. 478 F.3d 985, 996 (9th Cir. 2007); Campagna v. Mass.
Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 206 F. Supp. 2d 120, 127 (D. Mass. 2002), aff’d, 334 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2003).
64 See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
65 See discussion infra Part II.A.3.
66 See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2150 (2008); Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1011
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
67 See Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1013 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). For a detailed summary of the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, see MICHAEL MCGUINNESS,
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, DEVELOPMENTS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYEE FIRST AMENDMENT AND EQUAL
PROTECTION LAW 166-212 (2007).
68 For a further discussion on the three limitations referred to above, see Farrell, supra note 2, at
402-15.
69 See Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2157; Engquist, 478 F.3d at 996.
70 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
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A. Three Techniques Implemented by Lower Federal Courts to Limit the
Reach of Olech

1.

Requiring that Comparators Are Prima Facie Identical

The Supreme Court in Olech required that the plaintiff offer proof that
comparators were “similarly situated.” 71 Since Olech, courts have required
that to prevail on a class of one claim, plaintiffs need to offer comparators
that are more than “similarly situated.” 72 Rather, the “similarity between
plaintiffs and the persons with whom they compare themselves must be
extremely high.” 73 For example, in Purze v. Village of Winthrop Harbor, 74
the Seventh Circuit denied a class of one claim brought by prospective developers who relied on comparisons among three other developments to
allege that the Village of Winthrop Harbor treated these developers more
favorably. 75 The court cited Ciechon, a Seventh Circuit case decided well
before the Supreme Court’s decision in Olech, 76 to support the proposition
that the plaintiff was required and failed to show that comparators were
“identically situated in all relevant respects rationally related to the government’s mission.” 77
Similarly, in Neilson v. D’Angelis, 78 the Second Circuit reversed a jury
decision in favor of the plaintiff’s class of one claim holding that the plaintiff failed to prove, as a matter of law, that the comparators were similarly
situated within the meaning of the class of one doctrine. 79 In this case, Mr.
Nielson, previously an armed security guard, was disciplined for improperly unholstering his weapon and failing to inform his superiors that he had
done so. 80 Mr. Neilson introduced evidence that other officers were subjected to lesser disciplinary measures for similar behavior. 81 The court in
Neilson reasoned that the comparators “committed offenses that some rational people might deem as or more serious than Nielson’s offense,” but
“other rational people might regard them as less serious.” 82 Therefore, the
Neilson court required that the plaintiff show that no rational person could
71

Id.
See e.g., Lauth v. McCollum, 424 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2005).
73 Neilson v. D’Angelis, 409 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Purze v. Vill. of Winthrop
Harbor, 286 F.3d 452, 455 (7th Cir. 2002)).
74 286 F.3d 452 (7th Cir. 2002).
75 Id. at 455.
76 See discussion supra I.B.1.
77 Purze, 286 F.3d at 455.
78 409 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2005).
79 Id. at 101.
80 Id. at 101-02.
81 Id. at 103.
82 Id. at 106.
72
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have disciplined each officer differently given the nature of the offenses. 83
In Neilson, the court writes, “[t]he parties in this case, however, appear to
assume that the standard of ‘similarity’ in ‘class of one’ cases is analogous
to that used in cases where discrimination based on membership in a specific protected class is claimed.” 84
As another illustration of the “prima facie identical” requirement, in
Ferguson v. City of Rochester School District, 85 a teacher previously employed in a New York public school brought an action against her former
employer alleging that her employer wrongfully rejected her request to rescind a certain employment contract. 86 The Voluntary Employee Separation
Agreement (“VESA”) was a cost-cutting program enacted by the school
district which provided monetary compensation and health benefits to more
veteran, higher-paid teachers who agreed to resign from their positions in
the school district. 87 Plaintiff Thomasina Ferguson entered into the VESA
which required a signed notice indicating that the agreement was irrevocable. 88 After signing the form on a Friday, Ms. Ferguson submitted a letter to
the school district the following Monday wishing to rescind her decision to
accept voluntary separation. 89 The school district informed Ms. Ferguson
that her decision was irrevocable per the terms of the agreement. 90 Ms. Ferguson then brought a class of one equal protection action alleging that the
school district had allowed another individual, Jeanne Nix, to rescind her
VESA election under very similar circumstances. 91
The court’s rejection of Ms. Ferguson’s claim rested on a finding that
she failed to show that her circumstances were “prima facie identical” to
that of Ms. Nix, her comparator. 92 Ms. Nix, who was allowed to rescind her
agreement, provided evidence that her husband suddenly left her and she
would suffer “severe economic hardship” given the sudden loss of financial
support from her husband. 93 To offer proof that her situation was similar to
that of Ms. Nix’s, Ms. Ferguson alleged that: (1) on the day she signed the
agreement, she was taking prescribed medication that affected her judgment; (2) the VESA election caused similar economic hardship to that faced
by Ms. Nix, and that Ms. Ferguson was also sick and under a significant
amount of family duress when she signed the agreement; and (3) on the day
she signed the agreement, Ms. Ferguson and her husband believed they
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

Id.
Neilson, 409 F.3d at 104.
485 F. Supp. 2d 256 (W.D.N.Y. 2007).
Id. at 257.
Id.
Id. at 258.
Id.
Id.
Ferguson, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 259.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 259.

ENGQUIST V. OREGON DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

11

would be moving to Texas but plans suddenly changed. 94 The court found
that “[e]ven viewing the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
Ferguson’s and Nix’s situations at the times of their rescission requests
were not so similar that the District could not rationally have treated them
differently.” 95 The court noted that its task was not to find “whether Ferguson’s stated reasons for her request would have given the District a rational
reason to grant it,” but rather, “[t]he issue is whether Ferguson and Nix
were sufficiently dissimilar that the District had a rational basis for treating
them differently.” 96
The court keyed on the fact that the departure of Ms. Nix’s husband
was an “intervening” event suffered after Ms. Nix decided to take voluntary
separation from employment. 97 Although Ms. Ferguson’s allegation that her
and her husband decided not to move to Texas could be characterized as an
intervening event, the court declared that Ms. Ferguson’s deposition testimony revealed that the “plaintiff simply felt far less sanguine about her
decision” and so she changed her mind. 98 So, after taking a close look at
Purze, Neilson, and Ferguson, lower courts have continually and expressly
recognized a difference between a plaintiff’s burden in a class of one equal
protection claim relative to a class-based equal protection claim. The requirement that plaintiffs show that comparators are “prima facie identical”
provides the courts with an expansive technique to limit a potential class of
one claim. 99

2.

Showing a Specific Intent to Discriminate

Olech’s application of the class of one doctrine does require that the
plaintiff show that he was “intentionally treated different from others similarly situated.” 100 Taking this requirement one step further, the Second Circuit in Giordano v. City of New York, 101 in the recent aftermath of Olech,
specifically highlighted that the plaintiff must show “intentional disparate
treatment.” 102 Mr. Giordano, a police officer, sued his employer alleging
that he was wrongfully terminated for using a blood thinner.103 In support of
his claim, Mr. Giordano submitted evidence that the New York Police Department (“Department”) continued to employ another officer, Thomas
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

Id. at 261.
Id. at 260-61.
Id. at 261.
See Ferguson, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 261.
Id. at 262.
See MCGUINNESS, supra note 67, at 201.
Olech, 528 U.S. at 564.
274 F.3d 740 (2d Cir. 2001).
See id. at 751.
Id. at 742.
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Rowe, even though the Department knew that Mr. Rowe was taking the
same blood thinner found in Mr. Giordano’s system. 104 However, the court
rejected Mr. Giordano’s equal protection claim reasoning that he failed to
prove that the Police Department medical unit (Unit), who was directly
responsible for his termination, was aware that Mr. Rowe was taking the
same blood thinner. 105 Consequently, the Giordano court concluded that the
Unit could not have levied the disparate treatment alleged by Mr. Giordano
because the Unit was not actually aware that Mr. Rowe was also taking a
blood thinner. 106 This requirement imposes upon a plaintiff the arguably
difficult task of proving that those responsible for the alleged disparate
treatment were subjectively aware of any then present characteristics of the
comparators now used by the plaintiff to illustrate disparate treatment.

3.

Proving that the Government Possessed a Subjective Ill-Will

Perhaps the most notable limitation on class of one claims created by
federal courts is the requirement that a plaintiff show “subjective ill will” or
“illegitimate animus.” 107 In the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Olech, Judge
Posner wrote that the class of one equal protection claim requires a showing
of “totally illegitimate animus toward the plaintiff by the defendant.” 108 In
reviewing the Seventh Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged
that the plaintiff’s allegations, “quite apart from the [defendant’s] subjective
motivation, are sufficient to state a claim of relief under traditional equal
protection analysis.” 109 Yet, lower courts have ignored this Supreme Court
reasoning by immediately reinstating the Seventh Circuit’s “subjective illwill” requirement, and continuing to apply this requirement in more recent
cases. 110
104

Id. at 751.
Id.
106 Id.
107 E.g., Levenstein v. Salafsky, 414 F.3d 767, 775-76 (7th Cir. 2005) (“We have recognized that a
person may also state a claim under the ‘class of one’ theory by showing that . . . the cause of the differential treatment is a ‘totally illegitimate animus toward the plaintiff by the defendant.’” (quoting Olech
v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998))); Bell v. Duperrault, 367 F.3d 703, 709 (7th
Cir. 2004) (“While [defendant’s] alleged behavior was perhaps inconsiderate or inappropriate, it does
not demonstrate the type of ‘deep-seated animosity’ that this Court has found to support an equal protection claim.” (citing Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 178 (7th Cir. 1995))); Bartell v. Aurora Public
Schools, 263 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[The defendant] must show that ‘the action taken by
the state, whether in the form of prosecution or otherwise, was a spiteful effort to ‘get’ [the defendant]
for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective.’” (quoting Esmail, 53 F.3d at 180)).
108 Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998).
109 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000).
110 Almost immediately after the Supreme Court’s decision in Olech, Judge Posner, in Hilton v.
City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005 (2000), effectively ignored the Supreme Court’s rejection of the “subjective ill-will” requirement citing to the opinion he authored in the Seventh Circuit to support a re105
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For an illustration of the stubbornness by the courts to set aside the
subjective ill-will requirement, consider the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Bartell v. Aurora Public Schools. 111 In Bartell, Richard Bartell, a former school
employee, brought an equal protection claim as a result of the school district’s investigation of sexual harassment charges against Mr. Bartell. 112
After recognizing the Supreme Court’s decision in Olech, the Bartell court
required that Mr. Bartell show that the alleged disparate treatment by the
government “was a spiteful effort to ‘get’ [Bartell] for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective.” 113 The court denied Mr. Bartell’s
claim by reasoning that even if the allegations of differential treatment were
true, the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that the school district
was out to “get” Mr. Bartell. 114 Why did the court in Bartell require the
plaintiff to show subjective ill-will 115 when this element was expressly discarded by the Supreme Court in Olech? 116 The analysis by the Bartell court
suggests more than mere confusion and instead, reflects an effort by lower
federal courts to discourage claims which could cause over-interference
with everyday governmental functions, while still allowing a rule to prevent
irrational and bad-spirited governmental conduct. To recall, Justice Breyer,
concurring in Olech, recommended that the added requirement of “subjective ill-will” would relieve “any concern about transforming run-of-the-mill
zoning cases into cases of constitutional right.” 117
Under Olech, to state a class of one equal protection claim, a plaintiff
was required to show that he had been “intentionally treated differently
from others similarly situated and there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” 118 Seven years later while operationalizing the Olech
class of one claim, courts require class of one plaintiffs to show that the
government, possessing a specific intent coupled with subjective ill-will,
treated the plaintiff differently from other(s) who were “prima facie identical in all relevant respects.” 119 As discussed next, the Supreme Court has

quirement of subjective ill-will. Id. at 1008. For a recent case requiring subjective ill-will, see St. John’s
United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 638 (7th Cir. 2007).
111 263 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2001), overruled by Pignanelli v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, No. 071251, 2008 WL 4149656 (10th Cir. Sept. 10, 2008) (recognizing that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Engquist would have precluded Mr. Bartell, a public employee, from bringing his initial claim against
his employer).
112 Id. at 1144.
113 Id. at 1149 (quoting Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995)).
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000).
117 Id. at 566 (Breyer, J., concurring).
118 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
119 Purze v. Vill. of Winthrop Harbor, 286 F.3d 452, 455 (7th Cir. 2002). This rule was derived by
the author by following the advice of Judge Reinhardt and employing all three techniques used to limit a
class of one equal protection claim. See Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1013 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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confirmed that there is yet another limitation—that is, the plaintiff may not
be a public employee bringing a claim against his public employer. 120 As
outlined supra in the Introduction, Part III argues that the Engquist Court’s
latest limitation on a class of one claim has failed to clarify the contours of
the class of one theory.
B.

Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture: The Facts

Plaintiff Anup Engquist was hired as an international food standards
specialist for the Export Service Center (ESC) which is a laboratory in the
Laboratory Services Division (LSD) housed within the Oregon Department
of Agriculture (ODA). 121 Ms. Engquist made several complaints to her supervisor, Norma Corristan, about Joseph Hyatt, a named defendant and
LSD employee. 122 Ms. Corristan responded to Ms. Engquist’s complaints
by requiring that Mr. Hyatt attend anger management and diversity training. 123
Mr. Hyatt and John Szczepanski, an assistant director of the ODA, allegedly developed a plan to “get rid of” both Corristan and Engquist by
restructuring the ESC. 124 After state-wide budget cuts, Mr. Szczepanski
eliminated Ms. Corristan’s and Ms. Engquist’s positions. 125 Before Ms.
Engquist’s trial, Ms. Corristan successfully sued the ODA, Mr. Szczepanski, and Mr. Hyatt ending in a jury verdict finding that Mr. Hyatt discriminated against Ms. Corristan on the basis of race or gender violating her
equal protection rights. 126 Ms. Engquist subsequently sued the same three
parties but instead of claiming membership in a protected class, Ms. Engquist proceeded under a class of one theory of equal protection. 127 Among
other findings, the jury found for Ms. Engquist on her class of one equal
protection claim and entered judgment in favor of Ms. Engquist awarding
her $350,000 in damages plus attorney’s fees and costs. 128 The defendants
appealed on several grounds, one of which was defendant’s contention that
Ms. Engquist’s class of one claim should fail at its inception because the
doctrine should be inapplicable to claims brought by public employees
against their employer. 129

120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

Engquist v. Or. Dept. of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2157 (2008).
Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2149.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Engquist v. Or. Dept. of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 991 (9th Cir. 2007).
Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2149.
Id. at 2149-50.
Engquist, 478 F.3d at 992.
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The Ninth Circuit’s Decision

While the limitations discussed above have restricted successful
claims, the Ninth Circuit decided that the uncertainty among the federal
courts provided an opportunity to further limit the class of one equal protection claim. 130 In a 2-1 decision, the Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of
the lower court holding that the class of one theory was inapplicable to public employers. 131 The majority began by summarizing the rule in Olech, but
as a sign of things to come, the court immediately followed by raising the
concerns mentioned by Justice Breyer that “Olech would transform ordinary violations of state or local law into constitutional cases.” 132 The court
recognized that it had applied the class of one theory in regulatory contexts,
but had not decided on whether the class of one theory should be “extended” to the public employment context. 133 The court’s use of the word
“extended” further revealed the direction that the majority planned to take.
As noted by the majority themselves, no other court prior to the Ninth Circuit, including the Supreme Court in Olech, has drawn any distinction between the theory’s application in a regulatory context versus an employment context. 134 The word “extended” presupposes that such distinctions
have been drawn by other courts. The majority indicated that although other
courts have applied the class of one theory in the context of public employment, almost no claim has ever prevailed leaving “Engquist’s thus-far
successful claim . . . a unique case.” 135 The court then made several arguments for why the class of one theory should not be applied to public employment decisions. 136
First, the court recognized that a different approach must be taken in
reviewing the government’s decisions as an employer as opposed to a regulator. 137 Quoting the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit wrote that “the government as an employer indeed has far broader powers than does the government as a sovereign.” 138 The court further argued that the government
has limited the constitutional rights of its employees in the First Amendment context and the Fourth Amendment context to “balance the govern-
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Id. at 996.
Id. at 990.
132 Id. at 992-93. (citing Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565-66 (2000)).
133 Id. at 993.
134 Id.
135 Engquist, 478 F.3d at 994 & n.2.
136 Id. at 994-96.
137 Id. at 994.
138 Id. at 994 (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (O’Connor, J., plurality
opinion) (discussing the government’s ability to limit free speech of its employees to efficiently carry
out public services)).
131
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ment employer’s legitimate interest in its mission.” 139 Consistent with this
notion, the Engquist court stated that “[t]he class-of-one theory of equal
protection is another constitutional area where the rights of public employees should not be as expansive as the rights of ordinary citizens.” 140 Secondly, the Engquist majority reasoned that allowing judicial review of the
actions of public employers frustrated the idea of government at-will employment. 141 Third, the majority stated that “when a public employee is
subjected to unequal treatment at work for arbitrary reasons, the need for
federal judicial review under equal protection is ‘especially thin’ given the
number of other legal protections that public employees enjoy.” 142 Fourth,
the majority warned against the “flood of new cases” that would arise if
federal courts were required to review everyday decisions made by government employers. 143 Lastly, the majority closed by stating that “Olech is
too slender a reed on which to base such a transformation of public employment law.” 144
Judge Reinhardt raised three basic arguments in his dissenting opinion:
(1) the majority’s holding created inter-circuit conflict; (2) the holding is
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent; and (3) the majority’s policy
concerns did not justify the holding. 145 Justice Reinhardt argued that neither
the Ninth Circuit nor any other circuit has placed a categorical restriction on
the application of the class of one theory or limited the Fourteenth Amendment rights of public employees. 146 Also, he commented that the majority
was “needlessly concerned that the class of one rule would eliminate at-will
employment.” 147 Judge Reinhardt contended that regardless of the class of
one theory, the decisions of public employers have always been insulated
by the rational basis test and as a result, the review of decisions made in
regards to at-will employees would not change. 148 Finally, the dissenting
judge recommended that the best approach to decide class of one claims
was to apply three overlapping limitations previously applied by the federal
courts: (1) identically situated comparators, (2) a high burden of disproving
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Engquist, 478 F.3d at 994-95 (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006)).
Id. at 995.
141 Id. (citing NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 273-74 (1975); Andrews v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 324 (1972)). To further support this proposition, the Engquist court
quoted the Supreme Court stating “an at-will government employee . . . generally has no claim based on
the Constitution at all.” Engquist, 278 F.3d at 995 (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 679
(1994) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion)).
142 Id. (quoting Lauth v. McCollum, 424 F.3d 631, 633 (7th Cir. 2005)).
143 Id.
144 Id. at 996.
145 Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1010-14 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
146 Id. at 1011-12.
147 Id. at 1012-13.
148 Id.
140
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any rational basis or mistake, and (3) an illegitimate animus or malice. 149
However, Judge Reinhardt added that in cases involving malice, the employee need not provide a comparator identical in all relevant respects because “the government does not ordinarily treat people maliciously, and,
thus, is obviously treating individuals unequally under such circumstances.” 150
D.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

On January 11, 2008, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review
the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Engquist. 151 In a 6-3 decision issued on June
9, 2008, the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision holding that a
class-of-one equal protection claim is not cognizable in the context of public employment. 152 The Court did not “quarrel with the premises of Engquist’s argument. . . . [that] [i]t is well settled that the Equal Protection
Clause ‘protect[s] persons, not groups, and that the Clause’s protections
apply to administrative as well as legislative acts.” 153 But, the Court reasoned that its “traditional view of the core concern of the Equal Protection
Clause as a shield against arbitrary classifications, combined with the
unique considerations applicable when the government acts as employer as
opposed to sovereign” yields that a class of one theory of equal protection
does not apply in the context of public employment. 154
The majority echoed many of the arguments made by the Ninth Circuit
focusing on two main reasons to support its holding: (1) the “government
has significantly greater leeway in its dealing with citizen employees than it
does when it brings its sovereign power to bear on citizens at large”; 155 and
(2) employment decisions are inherently subjective unlike legislative or
regulatory classifications such as was the case in Olech. 156 The Court stated
that “[i]t is no proper challenge to what in its nature is a subjective, individualized decision that it was subjective and individualized.” 157 Also, similar to the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, the Court recognized that allowing
Engquist’s claim to move forward was at odds with the basic principle of
at-will employment “that an employee may be terminated for a ‘good rea149

Id. at 1013. See also discussion supra II.A.
Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1013.
151 Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agric., 478 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 977
(2008).
152 Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2150 (2008).
153 Id. at 2150 (internal citations omitted) (citing Adarand Constructor, Inc. v Peña, 515 U.S. 200,
227 (1995).
154 Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2151.
155 Id. at 2151.
156 Id. at 2153-54.
157 Id. at 2154.
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son, bad reason, or no reason at all. . . . [A] government’s decision to limit
the ability of public employers to fire at will is an act of legislative grace,
not constitutional mandate.” 158
Justice Stevens, with whom Justices Souter and Ginsburg joined dissenting, argued that it was incorrect and unnecessary to carve out this exception from a public employees’ constitutional rights. 159 The dissent argued that the outcome of Olech “was not determined by the size of the disadvantaged class . . . [or] the fact that the Village was discriminating
against a property owner rather than an employee . . . [and] [r]ather, the
outcome of Olech was dictated solely by the absence of a rational basis for
the discrimination.” 160 Further, to negate the importance the majority placed
on preserving “at will” employment, the dissent recognized that “recent
constitutional decisions and statutory enactments have all but nullified the
significance of the doctrine . . . . [so that] preserving the remnants of ‘atwill’ employment provides a feeble justification for creating a broad exception to a well-established category of constitutional protections.” 161 Finally,
similar to Judge Reinhardt’s opinion, Justice Stevens points out that class of
one claims are brought infrequently, and usually unsuccessfully, so that
there is no threat of a multitude of these claims suddenly coming into federal court. 162

III. AND THE WRONG RULE BEGINS TO CREATE MORE WRONG RULES
Even Judge Posner, a principal architect of the class of one theory, 163
has stated that “the fact that the post-Olech cases are all over the map suggests a need for the Court to step in and clarify its ‘cryptic’ per curiam decision [in Olech].” 164 Engquist provided the Court with this opportunity but
instead of clarification, we received a misplaced effort that approaches the
class of one doctrine from the wrong direction. In his dissent in Engquist,
Justice Stevens wrote that “[e]ven if some surgery were truly necessary to
prevent governments from being forced to defend a multitude of equal protection ‘class of one’ claims, the Court should use a scalpel rather than a
meat-axe.” 165 Analyzing three cases decided immediately after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Engquist, Part III.A sets out to illustrate that lower
courts have followed the Court’s lead by using the same meat-axe to incor158

Id. at 2155-56.
Id. at 2157 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160 Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2158 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161 Id. at 2160.
162 Id. at 2160-61; Engquist v. Or. Dept. of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 1013 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting).
163 See Farrell, supra note 2, at 385.
164 Bell v. Duperrault, 367 F.3d 703, 711-12 (7th Cir. 2004).
165 Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2158 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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rectly expand per se exclusions to class of one claims. Next, Part III.B concludes by arguing that while courts may be correct in surrendering relatively large leeway to governmental conduct in certain contexts, the rational
basis test has always shielded review of highly discretionary government
conduct. For that reason, although we should expect continued evolution of
the rational basis test as applied to class of one equal protection claims, it’s
unnecessary and incorrect to continue creating a plethora of new substantive rules excluding certain plaintiffs from the Fourteenth Amendment’s
protection against irrational and unequal treatment by the government.
A.

Life After Engquist
1.

Siao-Pao v. Connolly

In Siao-Pao v. Connolly, 166 a case from the Southern District of New
York, Leopold Siao-Pao, incarcerated for second-degree murder and firstdegree robbery, sought habeas relief following a denial of parole. 167 SiaoPao challenged the Parole Board’s decision on several grounds, one of
which was that the Parole Board violated his equal protection rights. 168 To
support his equal protection claim, Siao-Pao offered three comparators. 169
Particularly, Siao-Pao compared himself to Kathy Boudin who received a
similar sentence for a similar conviction but was granted parole. 170 After
analyzing Siao-Pao’s equal protection claim under the test of selective enforcement and the class of one doctrine, the Siao-Pao court found that his
claim failed under both theories. 171
As to the class of one claim, the Siao-Pao court recognized that the
Second Circuit “interpreted the Olech standard to require that differential
treatment be both intentional and irrational to satisfy the class of one standard.” 172 Citing Engquist, the Siao-Pao court goes on to state that “the Supreme Court recently clarified the Olech holding by limiting class of one
claims in contexts characterized by individualized and subjective determinations where ‘allowing a challenge based on the arbitrary singling out of a
particular person would undermine the very discretion that such state officials are entrusted to exercise . . . . [The Parole Board’s decision] is discretionary, as was the decision in Engquist, where the Supreme Court rejected
a class of one argument and accorded deference to the state’s determination
166
167
168
169
170
171
172

564 F. Supp. 2d 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Id. at 240.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 245-46.
Id.
Id.
Siao-Pao, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 246.
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based on the subjective and individualized nature of the decision.’” 173 So,
less than a month after the Supreme Court’s decision in Engquist, a new test
appears to be emerging. 174 Now, at least in the Southern District of New
York, the court will look first to whether the government’s decision is the
type that is individualized and subjective. 175 If so, the court warns potential
claimants like Siao-Pao that “[g]iven the numerous factors considered by
the Parole Board,” it is doubtful that any claimant will be able to demonstrate irrational and wholly arbitrary acts and intentional disparate treatment. 176 Thus, the Siao-Pao court quickly took Engquist as a sign that the
Supreme Court may not object to further categorical restrictions to the application of the class of one theory—outside of the public employment context—so long as the decision can be characterized as individualized and
subjective.
2.

Douglas Asphalt, Co. v. Qore, Inc.

Soon after Engquist, in Douglas Asphalt, Co. v. Qore, Inc., 177 the Eleventh Circuit quickly adopted and expanded the reasoning of Engquist to
place another categorical restriction on class of one equal protection
claims. 178 In Douglas Asphalt, a government contractor brought a class of
one claim against Georgia Department of Transportation (“GDOT”) officials alleging that he was intentionally treated differently than other paving
contractors in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 179 After asserting
that Douglas’s performance on two previous repaving projects was inadequate, the GDOT awarded a third contract to the second lowest bidder instead of Douglas who was the lowest bidder. 180 Douglas countered the
GDOT’s charge by claiming that the test utilized by the GDOT finding

173

Id. at 245 (quoting Engquist v. Or. Dept. of Agric. 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2154 (2008)).
Siao-Pao was decided on June 25, 2008. The Supreme Court decided Engquist on June 9, 2008.
175 An unpublished decision from the Eastern District of New York reveals similar reasoning.
Analytical Diagnostics Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, No. 07-3908, slip op. at **3-5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2008).
Regardless of the other serious factual issues raised by plaintiff as to different treatment and
defendants' motivations, the undisputed fact remains that [Department of Health] officials
possess discretion to subjectively evaluate laboratories and make licensing decisions, and any
differential treatment of [Analytical Diagnostics Labs] stemmed from these discretionary activities. As the Engquist Court noted, a plaintiff cannot raise a federal constitutional challenge to a necessarily subjective and individualized decision made by state officials. Plaintiff
has failed to allege a federal equal protection violation based on defendants' exercise of discretion as [Department of Health] employees.
Id. at *5 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).
176 Siao-Pao, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 245..
177 541 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2008).
178 Id.
179 Id. at 1271-72.
180 Id.
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Douglas’s work inadequate was inaccurate and false. 181 In dismissing
Douglas’s class of one claim, the Douglas Asphalt court relied heavily on
the Supreme Court’s decision in Engquist. 182 The court extensively quoted
the Engquist majority and had “little trouble applying the reasoning in
Engquist, directed at [sic] the government-employment relationship, to the
circumstances in this case involving a government-contractor relationship. .
. . Just as in the employee context, and in the absence of a restricting contract or statute, decisions involving government contractors require broad
discretion that may rest ‘on a wide array of factors that are difficult to articulate and quantify.’” 183
3.

Vassallo v. Lando

As the last example, in Vassallo v. Lando, 184 school administrators,
following a bathroom fire, claimed that they had reason to believe that the
eleventh grade plaintiff started the fire. With this belief, the administrators
interviewed the plaintiff and sought consent from the plaintiff to conduct a
search. 185 Following this activity by the administrators, the plaintiff brought
a class of one claim, among other claims, asserting that the administrators
improperly singled out the plaintiff for questioning without a rational basis
for doing so in violation of his right to equal protection. 186 In granting summary judgment for the defendants on the class of one claim, the court held
that “[a]s a threshold matter, this Court concludes that the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric. County Comm’n of Webster County would foreclose a ‘class of one’ claim by plaintiff in connection
with the discretionary decision by school administrators in this case as to
whether a student should be interviewed and searched for evidence of
criminal activity.” 187 The Vasallo court likened the facts in the case to the
traffic ticket hypothetical offered by the Engquist majority and concluded
that “[the school administrators] must have the leeway to single out certain
students for questioning when a disciplinary situation arises.” 188 Therefore,

181

Id. at 1272.
Id. at 1271-72.
183 Douglas Asphalt, Co., 541 F.3d at 1274 (quoting Engquist v. Or. Dept. of Agric., 128 S. Ct.
2146, 2154 (2008). The Douglas court also agreed with the alternative argument of the GDOT officials
that Douglas had failed to sufficiently allege similarly situated comparators as required for a class of one
claim. Id.
184 No. 06-CV-2520, 2008 WL 4855826 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2008).
185 Id. at **2-4.
186 Id. at *8.
187 Id. at *8 (internal citations omitted).
188 Id. at *10 (emphasis added). The Vasallo court, because the Second Circuit had not yet ruled
whether Engquist applied outside the public employment context, also proceeded to analyze the merits
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under Vasallo, it appears that school administrators in a large part of New
York need not worry that their “discretion” may at times be subject to rational basis review by the courts.
B.

The Scalpel and Not the Meat-axe

In Engquist, not only did the State fail to offer any explanation for
why Ms. Engquist was terminated, the State also “explicitly disclaimed the
existence of any workplace or performance-based rationale.” 189 The State
likely took this stance because, as the jury ultimately determined, the State
could not come up with a rational justification for terminating Ms. Engquist. In fact, the State entered this case with a slight disadvantage given
that a separate jury had already found that Mr. Hyatt, also Ms. Engquist’s
supervisor, unlawfully discriminated against Ms. Corristan, a friend and coworker of Ms. Engquist. 190 Although this finding of unlawful discrimination
was based on gender or ethnicity, the State and Mr. Hyatt entered the Engquist case with something less than clean hands. So rather than argue this
case on the merits, the State sought and obtained an exception for decisions
made by public employers. Now, the Engquist rule and its subsequent expansion threatens to improperly weaken rational basis review while failing
to offer sufficient justification for doing so.
Judge Reinhardt, dissenting in the Ninth Circuit, wrote that “[t]he rational basis test has always been used to insulate government decisions
from searching review that would interfere with governmental functions,
while still protecting individuals against heinous governmental conduct.” 191
Similarly, Justice Stevens’s dissent reminds us that “[o]ur decision in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, applied a rule that had been an accepted part
of our equal protection jurisprudence for decades: Unless state action that
intentionally singles out an individual, or a class of individuals, for adverse
treatment is supported by some rational justification, it violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s command that no state shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’” 192 Here, Justice Stevens
and Judge Reinhardt are simply reciting the relatively unremarkable proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to all treatment at the hands
of the State, and should protect individuals against unequal and irrational
governmental conduct. The question is then how does the Engquist majority, in finding an exception to rational basis review for public employers,
of the plaintiff’s class of one claim finding that the plaintiff, regardless of a per se exclusion, had failed
to meet the relatively robust similarly situated element of a class of one claim. Id. at *11.
189 Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2159 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190 See Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 991 (9th Cir. 2007).
191 Id. at 1012 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
192 Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2158 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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sidestep this central premise of the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, consistent with Justice Stevens and Judge Reinhardt, the majority stated:
When those who appear similarly situated are nevertheless treated differently, the Equal Protection Clause requires at least a rational reason for the difference, to assure that all persons
subject to legislation or regulation are indeed being “treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions.”

Thus, when it appears that an individual is being singled out by the government, the specter
of arbitrary classification is fairly raised, and the Equal Protection Clause requires a “rational
193
basisfor the difference in treatment.”

However, the majority goes on to recognize that “although government
employees do not lose their constitutional rights when they accept their
positions, those rights must be balanced against the realities of the employment context.” 194 In reality though, the balance ultimately struck by
Engquist was to deny a constitutional right to rational basis review when a
public employee accepts their position. In addition to the three traditional
levels of review afforded by the courts—i.e., strict scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny, and rational basis review 195 —Engquist creates a fourth level of
“non-review” for decisions made by government employers. And, the negative effects of Engquist don’t end there.
The Engquist majority stated that “[i]t is no proper challenge to what
in its nature is a subjective, individualized decision that it was subjective
and individualized.” 196 This language has been taken as an opportunity by
the lower federal courts to characterize an increasing amount of governmental conduct as “subjective and individualized.” 197 In just four short
months after the Engquist decision, we are witnessing how courts are less
worried with the public employment exclusion per se, and rather the courts
need only find that the government’s decision was more like a public employment decision and less like the regulatory decision found in Olech.
Now, under Engquist, a grant of broad discretion to the government in a
certain context equates to endless discretion as it relates to class of one
equal protection analysis. In order to avoid rational basis review, the government appears to have every incentive to both characterize its discretion
as overly broad as well as develop less standards by which to assess its
conduct.
Mentioned by Judge Reinhardt and expanded upon here, rational basis
review has always contained a mechanism to prevent “searching review that
193
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would interfere with governmental functions.” 198 In determining the rationality of a certain decision, the court must necessarily look at the discretion
the government was initially afforded to make that decision. The majority’s
trouble with the insulation already provided to government decisions under
rational basis review is captured by the majority’s grim prediction that by
“allowing class-of-one claims to go forward . . . governments will [still] be
forced to defend a multitude of such claims in the first place, and courts
will be obliged to sort through them in a search for the proverbial needle in
a haystack.” 199 First, the Court should have been more careful in limiting an
otherwise valid constitutional claim merely because plaintiffs may have a
tough time proving that a certain government decision was arbitrary. For
example, the defense of selective prosecution, based upon equal protection
considerations, is extremely difficult to prove given that prosecutors have
traditionally enjoyed almost unfettered discretion in deciding whom to
charge. 200 However, unlike Engquist which created a categorical exception
to the application of the class of one theory, courts that have analyzed selective prosecution claims have heightened the burden that defendants must
meet to sustain a successful claim. 201 Before Engquist, as discussed in depth
supra Part II.A, courts took a similar approach to that in selective prosecution claims by implementing broad limitations that applied to any class of
one claim regardless of its context. Second, the evidence simply doesn’t
support the Court’s dismal prediction that the federal docket will soon become overcrowded with class of one claims brought by public employees or
any other plaintiffs for that matter. The majority does not offer any specific
evidence that would suggest an astronomical increase in class of one claims
since Olech, but Justice Stevens does provide evidence to the contrary:
Prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case, “class of one” claims arising in the publicemployment context were permitted by every court that was presented with one. Yet there
have been only approximately 150 cases-both in district courts and the courts of appeals202
addressing such claims since Olech.

And finally, as to the Court’s discontent with searching for the “proverbial
needle in a haystack,” 203 Engquist may have been just that needle in a haystack consistent with the jury’s finding that Plaintiff Anup Engquist was
deserving of relief. 204 Instead and as it stands currently, at least government
employers, government contractors, public school students, and those pos198
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sibly facing parole hearings can expect to be precluded from having a hearing on the merits for a class of one equal protection claim. 205 The list of
those immune from a class of one equal protection claim is sure to expand
without further guidance from the Court. For now, at least some government actors are free to make discretionary decisions without offering any
reasonably conceivable rational justification for doing so.
CONCLUSION
What makes Engquist a big case is the fact that subsequent application
of the Engquist holding has revealed that the effect of the decision will have
a much greater, and possibly unanticipated, effect on equal protection jurisprudence in its entirety. Taking into account how much discretion a particular government actor has been granted, this Article set out to demonstrate
that certain State actors should not be excluded from providing at least
some conceivable explanation for the course of action taken. The Engquist
Court’s unwarranted focus on judicial economy unnecessarily chipped
away at the protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment—namely,
that plaintiffs such as Anup Engquist, at a minimum, should be able to obtain recovery where the State’s actions are shown to be completely arbitrary
and irrational.
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